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SERVING A SUMMONS BY FIRST CLASS MAIL:
WHY BANKRUPTCY RULE 7004(b)(1) VIOLATES
DUE PROCESS*
JONATHON S. BYINGTON*
Even though it has been accepted and widely used throughout the
nation for thirty-five years by courts, practitioners, and commentators,
the service method of delivering a summons and complaint solely by
first class mail under Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b) (1) violates due process.
Bankruptcy court jurisdiction was vastly expanded after the bankruptcy
rules first authorized service by first class mail. This expansion
fundamentally changed the nature of bankruptcy proceedings for which
mail service could be made. Basing the legitimacy of something on the
sole ground that it has been in existence for a long time without being
changed is unconvincing logic and standing alone, does not legitimize
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(1). Because a summons carries out the dual
purpose of providing notice to a defendant and conferring personal
jurisdiction over a defendant by a bankruptcy court, the Supreme
Court's mailings jurisprudence does not support the constitutionality of
delivering a summons by first class mail. Under Mullane's analyticalframework, inquiry into the expectations of defendants is appropriate
because the intended beneficiary of both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is the recipient of the process, not the sender or the
summoning court. Defendants simply do not expect to be sued through
a delivery method as informal as first class mail. In addition, service by
first class mail creates proof of service problems and produces
uncertainty over the defendant's receipt of the summons, resulting in
questions over the legitimacy of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
over the defendant. Consequently, delivery by first class mail under
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b) (1) should be eliminated and replaced with the
acknowledgment procedure contained in Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
* 0 2011 Jonathon S. Byington.
** Partner, law firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered. I thank Richard
Seamon, Jeremy Ladle, and Dustin Charters for their comments on earlier drafts.
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 1 2012
2 NC. LAWREVIEWADDENDUM [Vol. 90
INTRODUCTION
Methods of serving process in civil cases have both evolved and
eroded. In medieval England, arrest of the defendant was common at the
outset of civil actions at law.' Although arrest certainly provided notice, its
primary purpose was to accomplish the court's assertion of physical power
over the defendant.2 Eventually, arrest at the commencement of a civil
action was deferred.' Arrest was then replaced with subjection to the
court's power by personal delivery of process,' which served as the
foundation for one modern service method where a United States Marshal
personally hands the summons to a defendant.'
The idea that only a governmental officer, such as a United States
Marshal or deputy, could be the server was eventually abandoned in favor
of allowing the server to be any person that is at least eighteen years old
and not a party to the lawsuit.' Even the requirement that a defendant
personally receive the summons was diluted by the addition of an
alternative method allowing a summons and complaint to be left at the
defendant's "dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age
and discretion who resides there."
1. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *345; 1 GEORGE CROMPTON, THE
PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS 56 (Baker John Sellon ed.,
New York, Gould, Banks & Gould 1st Am. Ed., 1813) (1780). For a more detailed explanation of
the evolution of service of process in England, see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a
Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1568 (2002) ("In practice, indeed,
arrest became the initial form of process to compel the defendant's appearance in all three of the
superior courts."); Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of
Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1189-91 (1987) ("Through a
course of statutory enactments from 1267 to 1503, arrest at the outset of an action became the
norm in virtually all civil actions at law.").
2. Sinclair, supra note 1, at 1189 ("Although arrest obviously performed a notice-giving
function, a principal purpose of the procedure was to assert the court's power over the
defendant."); Richard S. Miller, Implementing Current Theories of Jurisdiction, Venue and
Service of Process-Proposals for Revision of the Ohio Statutes, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 116, 119
(1968) (stating that "the court's jurisdictional authority rested upon physical power over the
defendant"); Nelson, supra note 1, at 1570 ("In personal actions, then, a common-law court could
proceed to judgment against a defendant only if the defendant either actually appeared or at least
was given a valid command to appear, and was thereby brought within the court's power."); see
also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power, although in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain that power throughout
proceedings properly begun, and although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take
the place of service upon the person.").
3. See ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 77 (1952); Sinclair, supra note 1, at 1188-90.
4. Sinclair, supra note 1, at 1190.
5. See id. at 1190-91; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3), (e)(2)(A).
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B).
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From the recipient's' perspective, the summoning court's assertion of
power has gradually worn away. As one expert in the field aptly described:
The awesome impact of the sheriff arriving in armor and on
horseback to deliver a writ in medieval England and the authority of
the sovereign sealed in the hot, red wax of earlier times has been
replaced by a bland manila envelope carrying a postage stamp that
may celebrate notions of love or poetry.'
Although most modern service methods are welcome improvements to
those of earlier years (i.e., not needing to arrest all defendants in every civil
action), this Article argues the service method authorized by Rule
7004(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure violates a
defendant's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.o Rule
7004(b)(1) allows a summons and complaint to be served by "first class
mail postage prepaid . . . to the individual's dwelling house or usual place
of abode or to the place where the individual regularly conducts a business
or profession."" There is no acknowledgement of receipt, no certified
mailing, and no waiver document that must be signed and returned. Other
than the defendant's response, 2 if any, there is no way to know whether the
defendant received the summons and complaint.
Rule 7004(b)(1) is not a rare rule that is infrequently used. It applies in
adversary proceedings." For a twelve month period ending on March 31,
2010, there were 64,747 adversary proceedings filed throughout the United
States.' 4 Although first class mail is only one of several alternate methods
8. Use of the word "recipient" instead of "defendant" is intentional because one modern
service method deems service upon someone other than the defendant effective as to the
defendant. Id. If the underlying policy is that someone close to a defendant, such as a person who
resides at the defendant's dwelling and is of suitable age and discretion, will tell the defendant
about the summons, then the impact of the service method on the non-defendant recipient should
be considered.
9. Sinclair, supra note 1, at 1188-89.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b)(1).
12. For example, a defendant can respond by filing a responsive pleading or motion. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7012(a) (providing defendant with thirty days, subject to change by the court, to file a
responsive pleading); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b) (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)-(i) in
adversary proceedings).
13. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
14. U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS, ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, TERMINATED,
AND PENDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING
MARCH 31, 2009 AND 2010 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tables/FO8Mar1 0.pd
f.
2011] 3
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of service allowed in adversary proceedings," for cases involving
defendants who are individuals," Rule 7004(b)(1)'s minimal cost, time
savings, and ease of compliance presumably results in it being the favored
service method.
The name "adversary proceeding" is deceiving because it implies
something less than a full-blown lawsuit or action. However, an adversary
proceeding does not involve contested matters that can merely be raised
and resolved by motion,' 7 and includes much more than the routine notices
associated with the filing and administration of a bankruptcy case.' An
adversary proceeding is a separate lawsuit' 9 that is related to20 an original
bankruptcy case and has all of the attributes of a conventional federal
lawsuit.2' Adversary proceedings are governed by Part VII of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and many, but not all, of the Federal Rules
15. Bankruptcy Rule 7004 incorporates portions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and, in addition to serving by first class mail, provides alternative methods of service.
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b), (e)-(f).
16. Service of upon a defendant who is a domestic or foreign corporation; an officer or
agency of the United States; the United States trustee; a state, local, or other govemmental
organization: or the debtor in bankruptcy is governed by a different rule and is outside the scope
of this Article. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(b)(3)-(10).
17. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a) ("In a contested matter not otherwise governed by these
rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall
be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No response is required under this rule unless
the court directs otherwise.") An adversary proceeding is different than a contested matter.
Contested matters are routine disputes, such as disagreements over a creditor's proof of claim
filed in the debtor's bankruptcy, and are generally resolved by motion pursuant Rule 9014(a) of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Notably, Rule 9014(b) provides that a motion in a
contested matter must be served in the manner provided for service of a summons and complaint
in Rule 7004. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(b).
18. Examples of routine notices to creditors include the notice that a bankruptcy petition has
been filed, the time and location of the meeting of creditors, the proposed sale, use or lease of
property of the estate, and the deadline to file a proof of claim. See Henry E. Hildebrand, Ill,
Getting Noticed: The New Notice Requirements of Section 342, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
533, 534-35 (2005).
19. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 451-52 (2004).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2006). Federal district courts may refer any or all cases under title
11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11
to bankruptcy courts. The tag-along personal jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts is extremely broad:
"The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive
jurisdiction . . . of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of
such case, and of property of the estate." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d)(1) (2006). Interestingly, many
adversary proceedings applying state law would fail to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of
the federal courts because of the lack of diversity of citizenship and no federal question other than
the adversary proceeding's relationship to a bankruptcy case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006).
21. See Hood, 541 U.S. at 451-52.
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of Civil Procedure are adopted and incorporated therein.22 A formal
summons and complaint are required, and an answer may be filed.23
Rule 7004(b)(1)'s applicability is expanded by Bankruptcy Rule
7004(d), which allows service by first class mail to anywhere in the United
States.24 Courts have allowed in personam jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants so long as the defendants have sufficient contacts with the
United States.25 Thus, a hypothetical seller in New York who supplied
materials to a buyer in New York can be summoned and forced to appear
before a bankruptcy court located in California because the buyer's home
office is in California and that is where the buyer filed bankruptcy. No
minimum contacts with the state of California are required. The contact
need only be with the United States. The combination of the broad scope of
matters that can be adjudicated through an adversary proceeding,26 along
with nationwide service of process, results in commonly occurring notice
and service scenarios that raise grave due process concerns.
This Article begins by showing, in Part I, that the establishment of
first class mail as an alternate service method occurred before the vast
expansion of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, both as to subject matter and
nationwide personal jurisdiction. This timing illustrates that the drafters of
Rule 7004(b)(1)'s predecessor did not and could not have realized the full
implications of allowing service of a summons and complaint by first class
mail. Part II evaluates the various reasons why Rule 7004(b)(1) violates
due process. For example, two federal circuit cases that are repeatedly cited
by courts across the United States as support for the constitutionality of
Rule 7004(b) are questioned. This Article then evaluates the Rule under the
Supreme Court's decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,2 7 and considers the reasonable expectations of defendants. The so-
called remedy of vacating or setting aside a default judgment is examined.
22. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 7002-7005, 7016, 7018, 7020, 7055, 7056, 7065.
23. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003 (incorporating FED. R. Civ. P. 3 stating that filing the
complaint commences the legal action), 7004(a)(1) (incorporating FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1), which
requires a copy of the complaint to be served with the summons), and 7007 (incorporating FED.
R. Civ. P. 7, which outlines the pleadings that are allowed, including an answer).
24. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d) ("The summons and complaint and all other process except a
subpoena may be served anywhere in the United States.").
25. In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 629-30 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that "when an action
is in federal court on 'related to' jurisdiction, the sovereign exercising authority is the United
States, not the individual state where the federal court is sitting"); Gen. Am. Commc'ns Corp. v.
Landsell, 130 B.R. 136, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The 'minimum contact test,' applied to a
State and a defendant, has no relevance here because . .. § 1334 provides us with 'federal
question' jurisdiction.").
26. See discussion infra Part I.D.
27. 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (establishing the test of reasonableness under the
circumstances).
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Proof of service problems are discussed and a comparison to service by
mail under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made. The Article
concludes in Part III, by recommending a two-part solution to revise the
rule. First, service by first class mail under Rule 7004(b)(1) should be
eliminated. Second, Rule 7004(b)(1) should adopt and incorporate the
acknowledgment procedure contained in Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
I. BACKGROUND ON BANKRUPTCY RULE 7004(b)(1)
This part of the Article reviews the historical promulgation and
amendments to Rule 7004(b)(1) and its predecessors.28 The timing of
significant expansions to bankruptcy court jurisdiction is highlighted to
show that when first class mail was originally inserted into the rule, its
applicability was very limited. Examples of the broad scope of adversary
proceedings are provided to show the types of actions to which Rule
7004(b)(1) is currently applied.
A. Constitutional and Congressional Authority ofBankruptcy Rule
70 04(b) (1)
The "bankruptcy clause" of the Constitution empowers Congress to
establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."29 Congress has intermittently used this authority to enact,
repeal and amend various bankruptcy acts since the year 1800." In 1964,
Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe the rules of practice
and procedure in cases under the bankruptcy code, with the following
limitation: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
28. See, e.g., Windsor Commc'ns Grp. Inc. v. Grant, 75 B.R. 713, 730 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985) (noting that under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, "the courts' jurisdiction was an obvious
limitation to the exercise of that power. Moreover, the courts of bankruptcy had jurisdiction only
over 'summary' matters; 'plenary' proceedings had to be instituted in a state or federal court with
an independent jurisdictional basis"); Paul P. Daley & George W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy Court
Jurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 384-89 (2005).
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
30. The first American Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1800. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch.
19, 2 Stat. 19 (amended in 1801 and 1802, then repealed in 1803). Congress passed the second
Bankruptcy Act in 1841. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). The third
Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1867. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch.176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed
1878). The fourth Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1898. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat
544 (repealed in 1978 after significant amendments). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was repealed
and replaced with the Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
For a history of federal bankruptcy legislation, see generally I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§§ 20.01-.04 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009).
6 [Vol. 90
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right."" The Supreme Court noted later that it would be an "impermissible
effect" for a bankruptcy rule to preclude a person from exercising a
statutory right.32 Obviously the same reasoning is even more compelling
when applied in the context of a bankruptcy rule precluding a person from
exercising a constitutional right, such as due process of law.
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, the General Orders in Bankruptcy and Official Forms adopted
by the Supreme Court governed bankruptcy procedure." The admirable
efforts, struggles, and historical accounts of the members of the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules and the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure are detailed elsewhere.34 Even though the statutory
31. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-623, § 1, 78 Stat. 1001, 1001 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006)).
32. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 454 (2004). Interestingly, the
1964 version of 28 U.S.C. § 2075 stated: "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." § 1, 78 Stat. at 1001. This sentence was
intentionally removed in 1978 to make clear that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may
not supersede title 11 of the U.S. Code. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§ 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2685; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 449 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6405; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 157-58 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5943-44.
33. Lawrence P. King, The History and Development of Bankruptcy Rules, 70 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 217, 218 (1996). For an example, see Amendments to General Orders in Bankruptcy & the
Official Forms, 368 U.S. 1044 (1961).
34. See King, supra note 33, at 219-33 (providing a detailed treatment of the bankruptcy
rulemaking process from the perspective of one of the members and associate reporters of the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules). An example of the efforts of committee members is
illustrated by the November, 1964, Meeting Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules:
Discussion was held on whether the Committee can, by the rule that superseded Section
18 of the Bankruptcy Act, authorize registered or certified mail as a general mode of
service. There was a variety of opinions on this subject: that the mail would be sufficient
for service of a writ; that in involuntary bankruptcy cases certified mail was not
sufficient; that we should not stray from the Federal rules; that if some form of mail is
going to be permitted for bankruptcy, then it should be used generally under the Civil
Rules; that the existing draft is inadequate inasmuch as it calls for personal service or
publication and does not recognize other ways of service; that the Committee develop
Civil Rule 4 by supplementing it to add service by certified mail. The Committee was in
agreement that it needs to deal with extraterritorial service of process in supplemental
rules because FRCP doesn't handle the extraterritorial service of process either as to the
involuntary petition in bankruptcy or as to a controversy which may be heard by the
bankruptcy court. Professor Kennedy stated he thought he had the views of the
Committee in mind and that he would draft alternate rules on this subject for presentation
at the next meeting.
ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES, MINUTES OF THE NOVEMBER 1964 MEETING 4-5 (Nov.
18, 1964), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Minutes/BKI 1-1964-min.pdf. The minutes from the Advisory Committee's other meetings are
can be found at Minutes of Rules Committee Meetings, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts
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obligation to promulgate bankruptcy rules was placed on the Supreme
Court; it is unlikely the Court gave the proposed rules the same review and
consideration that was given to appellate opinions."
B. The Inception ofFormer Rule 704 and Amendments to Rule
70 04(b) (1)
In 1973, the Supreme Court prescribed Rule 704(c), the initial
predecessor to the present Rule 7004." Rule 704(c)(1) provided that
service could "be made by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt"
upon an individual by mailing a copy of the summons, complaint, and
notice of trial to his dwelling house or usual place of abode or to the place
where he regularly conducts his business or profession. The minutes from
the Advisory Committee's meeting in 1966 show that the committee
debated and discussed whether personal service or mailing was appropriate:
Judge [Elmore] Whitehurst asked if the rule gave the petitioning
creditor the option, in serving an involuntary petition on a local
respondent, to serve him by mail rather than by personal service.
Professor [Frank R.] Kennedy answered affirmatively. Judge
Whitehurst said it bothered him that service by mail could be made if
service by a United States marshal could be had. Professor Kennedy
said that was [a] matter for the Committee to consider. He said that
he was building into Rule 7.4 a set of priorities whereby service
there would be by personal service or by mail and by publication
under 7.4(e) only if neither mail service nor personal service was
possible.... He stated that there was no discrimination between
service by mail and personal service in Rule 1.7.2 as it was drafted.
Mr. [George M.] Treister said that he thought the Committee agreed
that service by return-receipt mail was just as good as personal
.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Minutes.aspx (last visited June 21,
2011).
35. See Order, Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 411 U.S. 989, 994 (1973)
(Douglas J., dissenting). Justice Douglas opposed the adoption of a bankruptcy rule that gave
referees power to cite and punish for contempt, stating:
I would not extend the contempt power to bankruptcy referees. Perhaps I am wrong. But
that issue has never been considered, debated, or voted upon by this Court. The Court is
merely the conduit for the Rules. It does not purport to approve or disapprove. As I have
said on other like occasions, it has merely placed its imprimatur on the Rules without
reading, let alone discussing, these Rules. ... [F]or most of these Rules I do not have
sufficient insight and experience to know whether they are desirable or undesirable. I
must, therefore, disassociate myself from them.
Id
36. Id at 1069-71; see also id. at 991-92 (1973) (approving the Bankruptcy Rules and
authorizing the Chief Justice to transmit rules to Congress).
37. Id. at 1069.
8 [Vol. 90
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 8 2012
SERVING A SUMMONS BY FIRST CLASS MAIL
service by marshal, because service by marshal just meant that he
left the summons at the house; it did not mean that the person served
received it. He also felt that many times it took longer for service
when it was done by the marshal. Judge [Elmore] Whitehurst said
that he had his answer, and if no one else was concerned, he
wouldn't pursue the matter. 8
At the time of the above-quoted 1966 committee meeting, personal
service was made by the United States Marshal Service.3 9
In 1976, the signed receipt requirement was eliminated and the rule
was amended to allow "[s]ervice of summons, complaint, and notice of trial
or pre-trial conference [to] also be made within the United States by first-
class mail postage prepaid."40 The Advisory Committee Note to the 1976
Amendment explained:
First Class mail postage prepaid is substituted for mail requiring a
signed receipt as the authorized mode of making service by mail in
the United States. Experience with the provision requiring a signed
receipt has been unsatisfactory. Although the defendant's correct
address is used for mailing, the defendant is often unavailable to the
delivering postman, either to sign or to refuse delivery. First-class
mail suffices for service pursuant to Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and for many other purposes.4 1
The Advisory Committee's reference to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure merits explanation. Like the current version of Rule 5, the
version of Rule 5 at the time of the Advisory Committee's note eliminated
the acknowledgement requirement for every pleading "subsequent to the
original complaint."42 For an initial summons and complaint, Rule 5 never
allowed service by mail without also requiring the defendant to sign and
return an acknowledgement.43 Thus, the Advisory Committee's reference to
Rule 5(b) as a basis to support first class mail was erroneous, because the
38. ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES, MINUTES OF THE OCTOBER 1966 MEETING 17-
18 (Oct. 31, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/BK10-1966-min.pdf.
39. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
77 F.R.D. 613, 618-22 (1978); see also Sinclair, supra note 1, at 1198 (stating that the United
States Marshal Service had become burdened by serving process by 1978).
40. Bankruptcy Rule 704(c), as amended, 425 U.S. 1129, 1131 (1976). For an example of
the then new rule being applied, see In re Park Nursing Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 261, 262-64 (6th
Cir. 1985).
41. Windsor Commc'ns Grp. Inc. v. Grant, 75 B.R. 713, 736-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985)
(quoting 1976 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 704 Amendment).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a) (as amended Jan. 21, 1963).
43. See 128 CONG. REC. H9848, H9856 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (enacting Pub. L. No. 97-
462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1982)).
2011] 9
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Advisory Committee's amendment allowed first class mail to be used to
serve the initial summons and complaint.
In 1984, Rule 704(c) was replaced with Rule 7004(b), which retained
in identical form the relevant language.44 In 1987, insignificant revisions
were made to clean up the language.45 The relevant language of the present
Rule 7004(b)(1) has remained unchanged since the 1987 amendment.46
C. Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction Grew After the Rule Was Changed to
Allow Service by First Class Mail
Understanding the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts at the time the
signed receipt requirement was eliminated in 1976 helps explain why it
may have seemed insignificant to allow a summons and complaint to be
served by first class mail.
Prior to 1978, the federal district courts were "courts of bankruptcy,"
and bankruptcy referees were given limited power to assist the district
courts in exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction. 7 Bankruptcy court jurisdiction
was limited to summary jurisdiction and plenary jurisdiction.48 Summary
jurisdiction allowed a bankruptcy referee to handle matters related to
bankruptcy estate administration.4 9 Plenary jurisdiction gave district courts
authority over actions by a bankruptcy trustee against parties that had not
44. Compare Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 with 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
45. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004 advisory committee's note (making "technical
amendments" to subsections (a), (b), (e), and (f), such as deleting the hyphen between "first class"
and also removing the masculine references of "he" and "his" to gender neutral references of
mailing to "the individual").
46. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004 (amending subsections other than (b) after 1987).
47. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 2, 38-39, 30 Stat. 544, 544, 555-56 (repealed in
1978 after significant amendments).
48. See Daley & Shuster, supra note 28, at 385 (noting that the 1898 Bankruptcy Act
distinguished between the two types of jurisdiction).
49. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A
Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 721, 792 (1994). Summary
jurisdiction could be had for
(i) matters involving the administration of the bankruptcy case, (ii) disputes involving
property in the actual or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court, (iii)
proceedings in which the parties had consented to bankruptcy court jurisdiction
(expressly, impliedly by failing to object in time, or impliedly by filing a proof of claim
or otherwise participating in the bankruptcy case), and (iv) a few limited matters over
which the statute expressly granted jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts.
Id Many scholars and practitioners noted the difficulty distinguishing between summary and
plenary jurisdiction. See Herbert U. Feibelman, What Is the Difference Between Summary and
Plenary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy?, 39 FLA. B.J. 155, 155-60 (1965) (relating a cautionary tale
of one Jacksonville lawyer and elaborating the differences between the two types of jurisdiction).
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consented to bankruptcy authority."o Consequently, before 1978, a
bankruptcy court was basically limited to in rem jurisdiction."
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress expanded the
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to include all civil proceedings arising
under title 11 of the United States Code or arising in or related to a title 11
case.52 This expansion allowed bankruptcy courts to have jurisdiction over
civil suits seeking personal judgments as well as in rem judgments over
property." It also moved the adjudication of most bankruptcy litigation
from the federal district and state courts to bankruptcy courts.54 The Senate
Judiciary Committee explained the broad extent of jurisdiction granted in
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
This broad grant of jurisdiction will enable the bankruptcy courts,
which are created as adjuncts of the district court for the purpose of
exercising the jurisdiction, to dispose of controversies that arise in
bankruptcy cases or under the bankruptcy code. Actions that
formerly had to be tried in the State court or in the Federal district
court, at great cost and delay to the estate, may now be tried in the
bankruptcy court. The idea of possession and consent as bases for
jurisdiction is eliminated. The adjunct bankruptcy courts will
exercise in personam jurisdiction as well as in rem jurisdiction in
order that they may handle everything that arises in a bankruptcy
case.55
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,56 the
Supreme Court struck down the law granting authority to bankruptcy courts
50. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23(a), 30 Stat. 544, 552 (repealed in 1978 after
significant amendments).
51. See Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General
Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 850 (2000) (noting that the
1978 reforms shifted from an in rem jurisdiction theory to an in personam jurisdiction theory).
For an exhaustive review of the history and development of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, see id.
52. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 241(a), §1471(b), 92 Stat.
2549, 2668.
53. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90-92 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction
violated Article Ill of the Constitution and noting that the suit against Marathon concerned
ordinary state law and contract claims that were only brought to the bankruptcy courts since
Northern Pipeline had filed for reorganization).
54. Lloyd D. George, From Orphan to Maturity: The Development of the Bankruptcy System
During L. Ralph Mecham's Tenure as Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1491, 1494 (1995).
55. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 153 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939: see also
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 48-49 (1977) ("Possession of the res[] that is the subject of a particular
proceeding will no[] longer be relevant. The bankruptcy courts will have in personam jurisdiction
over all proceedings, whether or not involving a specific item of property."), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6010.
56. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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to adjudicate proceedings "related to" a bankruptcy case and held that
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction could not be assigned to non-Article III
bankruptcy courts." The holding necessitated a restructuring of the
jurisdictional scheme and led to the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984," which permitted district
courts to refer all bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy judges.5 9 Cases were
divided between those that could be "heard and determined" by non-Article
III bankruptcy courts,0 and cases that could only be "heard" by bankruptcy
courts and then must be finally determined by district courts."' The
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 did not
change the statutory language of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
conferring original but not exclusive jurisdiction to district courts of "all
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases
under title 11 ."62
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 also vastly enlarged the
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts from the territorial jurisdiction of the
district within which the court of bankruptcy was located to the territorial
limits of the entire United States.
None of these expansions were in existence at the time the Advisory
Committee drafted the rule allowing service of the initial summons and
complaint by first class mail. The extension of jurisdiction to the territorial
limits of the United States, as well as nationwide service of process,
allowed a bankruptcy court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over
57. Id. at 87 n.40 (plurality opinion) ("It is clear that, at the least, the new bankruptcy judges
cannot constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide this state-law contract claim against
Marathon.").
58. Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984).
59. Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act, Sec. 105(a), § 157(a), 98 Stat. at
340.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006).
61. § 157(c)(1) ("The bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the
district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions and
after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.").
62. Compare Sec. 101(a), § 1334(b) ("Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers
exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title I.") with Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, Sec. 241(a), § 1471(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668 ("Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.").
63. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, Sec. 241(a), § 1471(e), 92 Stat. 2549,
2669.
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anyone who could be served by mail within the United States.64 Of course,
personal jurisdiction and venue are not the same, and adversary
proceedings are still subject to proper venue requirements." Nonetheless, at
the time the Advisory Committee created Rule 7004(b)(1)'s predecessor,
both the scope of adversary proceedings and the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts were very limited.
D. Scope ofApplicability
The type of actions to which Rule 7004(b)(1) applies is surprisingly
broad. The rule applies to adversary proceedings," which include a host of
matters such as an action to set aside property transfers, void a lien,
determine the extent of an interest in property, determine the
dischargeability of a debt, impose injunctive relief, or enter a money
judgment against a party.0 Additionally, there is no required minimum or
maximum dollar amount."
Where a plaintiff is seeking a money judgment, the subject matter of
an adversary proceeding includes state-law claims of breach of contract or
tortious injury by the debtor in bankruptcy.69 Adversary proceedings also
include actions to determine the priority of a lien in property pursuant to
state law.7 ' Depending upon the nature of the claim, the plaintiff in an
adversary proceeding may be a bankruptcy trustee, the debtor in
bankruptcy, or a third party.7 ' From a defendant's perspective, an adversary
64. See, e.g., Fleet v. U.S. Consumer Council, Inc. (In re Fleet), 53 B.R. 833, 841 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1985) ("There is no requirement that a defendant reside in or do business in the state or
district where an adversary proceeding is commenced in order for the bankruptcy judge,
exercising the power of the district court, to obtain in personam jurisdiction over that
defendant."); Jahan Co. v. Dakota Indus., Inc., 27 B.R. 575, 578 (D.N.J. 1983); Benchic v.
Century Entm't Corp. (In re Century Entm't Corp.), 21 B.R. 160, 162 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982);
Beasley v. Kelco Foods, Inc. (In re Trim-Lean Meat Products, Inc.), 11 B.R. 1010, 1011-13 (D.
De. 1981).
65. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408, 1412 (2006); 28 U.S.C.A § 1409 (West Supp. 2011); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7087 ("On motion and after a hearing, the court may transfer an adversary proceeding
or any part thereof to another district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412, except as provided in Rule
7019(2)."). FED. R. BANKR. P. 7019(2) requires a court to determine if part of the proceeding
involving a joined party should be transferred to another district or whether the entire adversary
proceeding should be transferred to another district. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7019(2).
66. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 ("An adversary proceeding is governed by the rules of this Part
VII.").
67. See id.
68. See id. (containing no maximum or minimum dollar amount).
69. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1).
70. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2).
71. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6009, 7017.
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proceeding can obviously result in a deprivation of property under the Fifth
Amendment.72
II. ANALYSIS: WHY BANKRUPTCY RULE 7004(b)(1) VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS
This section analyzes various aspects of Rule 7004(b)(1), including
the rule's language and the case law that has applied the rule. The Supreme
Court's decisions approving notice by mail are explained for the purpose of
showing why these cases do not legitimize serving a summons by first class
mail. Finally, the implications of Rule 7004(b)(1) are examined under
Mullane's "reasonably calculated under all circumstances" 73 standard.
A. The Current Language ofRule 7004(b) (1)
The present language of Rule 7004(b)(1) allows for service in the
United States by first class mail "[u]pon an individual other than an infant
or incompetent, by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the
individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode or to the place where
the individual regularly conducts a business or profession." 74
The rule is drafted primarily from the sender's perspective. It
identifies the types of recipients (individuals located within the United
States that are not infants and not incompetent), the method of delivery
(first class mail postage prepaid), and the allowable addresses to place on
the envelope. Unlike the requirements of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,7' Rule 7004(b)(1) does not identify who can receive the
process. There is no requirement that the recipient be the defendant or
someone of suitable age and discretion or reside at the address.7 ' A
consideration of each component of the rule follows.
72. Windsor Commc'ns Group Inc. v. Grant, 75 B.R. 713, 734-35 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding
that "a money judgment against a person ... implicates a due process property interest" meriting
notice and an opportunity for a hearing).
73. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (establishing
the test of reasonableness under the circumstances).
74. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b)(1).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) (identifying permissible recipients of a summons, such as the
defendant or "someone of suitable age and discretion" who resides at the defendant's dwelling or
usual place of abode).
76. Contra id. at 4(e)(2)(A)-(B) (requiring that defendant be served process or, if process is
left at defendant's dwelling, that it be left with "someone of suitable age and discretion who
resides there").
14 [Vol. 90
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1. First Class Mail
The United States Postal Service strives to deliver first class mail in
one to three days; however, delivery time is not guaranteed." "The price of
First-Class Mail includes forwarding service to a new address for up to 12
months"" and "return service if the mailpiece is undeliverable."79 For most
individuals living in the United States, first class mail is part of daily life
and its use is fairly common.
2. The Individual's Dwelling House or Usual Place of Abode
The bankruptcy rules fail to define what constitutes an individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode." The language of the rule implies
that the address must be the one existing at the time of the mailing."
Courts have held that mailing to an intended recipient's " 'last known
address' is not sufficient to effect service under [Rule 7004(b)(1)] if the
respondent is not living at that address at the time service is attempted."82
This position is validated by comparing Rule 7004(b)(1) to Bankruptcy
Rule 7005. Bankruptcy Rule 7005 incorporates Rule 5 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which applies to motions, orders and pleadings filed
after the original complaint." Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorizes service by mailing to the person's last known
address.84 A comparison of Rule 7004(b)(1) to Bankruptcy Rule 7005
demonstrates that a higher burden of service is required for serving a
summons and complaint. The difference in language also suggests that an
individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode is not necessarily the
individual's last known address."
77. See DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, RETAIL MAIL: FIRST-CLASS MAIL PRICES AND
ELIGIBILITY, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE 133.2.1.1, http://pe.usps.com/cpim/ftp/manuals/
dmm300/133.pdf (last updated Aug. 1, 2011); UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 2000
COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT ON POSTAL OPERATIONS 90-91 tbl.5.1 (Apr. 6, 2001, 5:27 PM),
available at http://www.usps.com/history/_pdf/00comp_state.pdf (reporting on-time delivery rate
of first class mail between 87% and 94%).
78. See DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 777, at 133.2.2.2.
79. See id. at 133.2.2.3.
80. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001 (defining particular words and phrases to be used by the
rules but failing to define "dwelling place" or "usual place of abode").
81. Cf Jobin v. Otis (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 190 B.R. 111, 117 (D. Colo. 1995)
(holding that mailing a summons and complaint to an address on a three-year-old letter from the
recipient was not notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of the action).
82. See, e.g., In re Barry, 330 B.R. 28, 33 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
83. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7005 (incorporating Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(c).
85. See In re Barry, 330 B.R. at 33; DuVoisin v. Arrington (In re S. Indust. Banking Corp.),
205 B.R. 525, 533 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (noting the distinction drawn by the drafters of the rules not
to be insignificant).
2011] 15
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Despite the apparent intention to not allow service to an individual's
last known address, at least one court has interpreted and applied Rule
7004(b)(1) to merely require the last known dwelling house or usual place
of abode. Another court has held that an individual can have more than
one dwelling house or usual place of abode.
Although the "constitutional obligation"" to ensure proper service is
placed on the plaintiff,89 the rule does not provide a mechanism to ensure
that the address placed on the envelope is the correct address of the
defendant's "dwelling house or usual place of abode" or place where the
"individual regularly conducts a business or profession."90
For example, one court held that "[s]trict compliance with Rule 7004
precludes equating the term 'residence' with 'dwelling house or place of
abode' "9' and that a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode "is
the place, at the time of service, at which one could reasonably expect to
find the individual sought living." 92 Thus, although Rule 7004(b)(1) has
been interpreted by some courts to require the actual and present address of
the defendant at the time of service, it contains no requirement that the
sender provide proof that the address used satisfies that criteria.
3. The Place Where the Individual Regularly Conducts a Business or
Profession
The bankruptcy rules do not provide a definition for "the place where
the individual regularly conducts a business or profession." 93 One court has
found that an individual may have more than one business or profession.94
86. Garcia v. Cantu, 363 B.R. 503, 513 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) ("A place shown by a
plaintiff to have once been a valid 'dwelling house or usual place of abode' does not cease to be a
valid address for mailing of service unless the party contesting service establishes by evidence
that he has in fact abandoned that address.").
87. In re Xacur, 219 B.R. 956, 966-67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that in a highly
mobile and affluent society, "it is unrealistic to interpret rule 7004(b) so that the person to be
served has only one dwelling house or usual place of abode at which process may be left. 'There
is nothing startling in the conclusion that a person can have two or more dwelling houses or usual
places of abode, provided each contains sufficient indicia of permanence.' " (citation omitted)
(quoting In re Premium Sales Corp., 182 B.R. 349, 354 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)).
88. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799-800 (1983).
89. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(a)(1) (incorporating Rule 4(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure). Rule 4(c)(1) indicates that "[t]he plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and
complaint served." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).
90. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b)(1) (allowing for service to be made to the house or place of
business without providing any way to verify the address will qualify).
91. John v. Otis (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 190 B.R. 111, 116 (D. Colo. 1995).
92. Id. at 117.
93. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b)(1) (allowing for service to the place of regularly
conducted business but not defining the term).
94. Garciav. Cantu, 363 B.R. 503, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006).
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Another court held that when a defendant closed his used car lot, but
continued to engage in commerce and hold himself out as using the
address, that location qualified as a place where the defendant regularly
conducted business.95 Not working full time at an address, but being at the
address two to three times per week, has also been held to be sufficient.96
Consequently, the determination of whether a place is where an individual
regularly conducts a business or profession is a fact-intensive inquiry and
varies depending upon the circumstances.9 7 This factual dependency creates
uncertainty as to whether service has complied with the rule.
B. Mistaken Reliance Upon Two Federal Circuit Cases to Uphold
Service by First Class Mail
Two federal circuit cases, Belford v. Martin-Trigona (In re Martin-
Trigona)9 and Creditors Committee of Park Nursing Center, Inc. v.
Samuels (In re Park Nursing Center, Inc.)99 are repeatedly cited by courts
across the nation as authority to support the constitutionality of service by
first class mail under Rule 7004(b).' In addition, one authoritative
95. Morris v. Peralta (In re Perlata), 317 B.R. 381, 387 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (stating the
defendant "continued to engage in commerce at least to the extent of causing vehicles to be
repossessed and continued holding himself out in such dealings as using that business address").
96. Berry v. Maney (In re Sustaita), 438 B.R. 198, 209 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010).
97. Cf John v. Otis (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 190 B.R. 111, 117 (D. Colo. 1995) (noting
in a dwelling house or usual place of abode context that "[t]he inquiry is fact intensive").
98. 763 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1985).
99. 766 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1985).
100. Cossio v. Cate (In re Cossio), 163 B.R. 150, 156 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (citing In re
Park Nursing Center, Inc. to support the conclusion that service by mail "has withstood
constitutional challenge"); Whitaker v. Am. Partitions, Inc. (In re Olympia Holding Corp.), 230
B.R. 623, 627 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing In re Park Nursing Center, Inc. and concluding
that "[s]ervice in bankruptcy cases by U.S. Mail under what is now F.R.B.P. 7004(b), rather than
personal service, has been held to pass constitutional due process muster"); DuVoisin v.
Arrington (In re S. Indus. Banking Corp.), 205 B.R. 525, 530-31 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (citing In re
Park Nursing Center, Inc. as a basis for Rule 7004(b)(1) to survive facial constitutional
challenges); Holbrook v. Carlisle (In re Steel Reclamation Res., Inc.), No. 94-6396, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23750, at *4 (10th Cir. Aug. 21, 1995) (citing both In re Martin-Trigona and In re
Park Nursing Center, Inc. as a basis to conclude that "service by first class mail postage prepaid
conferred bankruptcy court jurisdiction"); Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Miller & Rhoads, Inc.
Secured Creditors' Trust, No. 3:91CV00637, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14418 (E.D. Va. Mar. 25,
1992) (citing In re Park Nursing Center, Inc. as a basis for holding that constitutional attacks are
without substance); Rakozy v. Hobbs (In re Hobbs), No. 89-00099, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1518
(Bankr. D. Idaho June 26, 1990) (citing In re Park Nursing Center, Inc. as a basis for the
allowance of service by mail); Wyandotte Indus. v. E.Y. Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford Corp.),
63 B.R. 479, 485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (referencing In re Martin-Trigona and concluding that
the issue of whether service by first-class mail is constitutional "has already been considered and
rejected by this circuit"); In re Mancini, No. 85-30168, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6407, at *26 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1986) (citing In re Park Nursing Center, Inc. and noting that "service by mail
was permitted and has withstood constitutional challenge"); Windsor Commc'ns Grp. Inc. v.
Grant (In re Grant), 75 B.R. 713, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (citing In re Martin-Trigona as
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commentary cites these two cases as the sole basis for the assertion that
"[a]lthough Rule 7004(b) has been attacked as violative of procedural due
process, its validity consistently has been sustained."' Despite the
widespread reference to these two cases, neither one provides a valid basis
for supporting the constitutional validity of service by first class mail under
Rule 7004(b). Both cases hinge upon defective reasoning and lack any
meaningful analysis of the actual language or effect of the rule.
1. In re Martin-Trigona
In Martin-Trigona, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to
determine whether former Bankruptcy Rule 704(c) and its successor Rule
7004(b) were "questionable" in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.'02 The
appellants argued that "the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over
them because the method of service was defective."' The Second Circuit
summarily rejected the argument by noting that "[n]othing in Northern
Pipeline indicated that the bankruptcy rules were invalid."'0 4 The only
reasoning given by the Second Circuit was that "the uninterrupted
legitimacy of former Rule 704(c) is evidenced by its retention substantially
unchanged as Rule 7004(b) of the new bankruptcy rules, promulgated after
Northern Pipeline."i'o
The Second Circuit's reasoning is shallow. Basing the legitimacy of
something on the sole ground that it has been in existence for a long time
without being changed is unconvincing logic and, standing alone, is
generally' not a justification for upholding the constitutional legitimacy of
a practice or rule.0 7
The holding does contain an implied approval arising from the
substantially unchanged rule language being adopted in the new bankruptcy
rules, but no substantive analysis is given. There is no evaluation of the
rule's language, effect, or implications. Martin-Trigona provides little
support for the court to have jurisdiction over the defendant because "first class mail service
under Rule 7004 is effective after the Northern Pipeline decision").
101. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30 7004.03, at 7004-22.
102. In re Martin-Trigona, 763 F.2d at 505 (referencing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id
106. Certainly there are some contexts that are exceptions to this assertion. For example,
consider the general principles of reliance or stare decisis.
107. For example, consider the application of that reasoning in the context of slavery or the
civil rights movement.
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HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 18 2012
SERVING A SUMMONS BY FIRST CLASS MAIL
support for upholding the constitutionality of service by first class mail
under Rule 7004(b).
2. In re Park Nursing Center, Inc.
In Park Nursing Center, Inc.,"' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
was asked to determine whether former Bankruptcy Rule 704(c) permitting
service of process by first class mail satisfied the constitutional
requirements of procedural due process. 09 In that case, process was served
by first class mail addressed to the defendant's last known address, which
was the residence of his wife." At the time of service, the defendant was
separated from his wife."' Although the defendant submitted a change of
address form to the United States Post Office updating his mailing address,
the decision does not indicate if the defendant actually received the mailed
process."' A default judgment for $34,200 was entered against the
defendant and the defendant's motion for relief against the default
judgment was denied because the defendant had failed to show that he had
a meritorious defense to the action."
The Sixth Circuit noted that bankruptcy proceedings occupied a large
and important place in the federal judicial system, and that bankruptcy
proceedings needed "a form of notice which is likely to achieve actual
notice in a large volume of cases but is not overly expensive or time
consuming."'' 4 The court continued by holding that in order to be
constitutionally adequate:
The rule must reasonably be calculated to achieve actual notice, and
there must be an available procedure, either as part of the rule, or as
part of the general rules of civil procedure under which a person who
fails to receive notice, through no fault of his own, has some
108. Creditors Comm. Of Park Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Samuels (In re Park Nursing Ctr., Inc.),
766 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 262.
110. In re Park Nursing Ctr., 766 F.2d at 262. Former Bankruptcy Rule 704(c) required the
mailing be made to an individual's dwelling house or usual place where he regularly conducts his
business or profession. Bankruptcy Rule 704(c), as amended, 425 U.S. 1131 (1976). Although
process in Park Nursing Ctr., Inc. was mailed to the defendant's last known address, it was
forwarded from the last known address to the defendant's business address. 766 F.2d at 262. It is
unclear why using the last known address was not an independently sufficient ground for
reversal.
111. In re Park Nursing Ctr., 766 F.2d at 262.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 263. Admittedly, a significant reason in support of mail as a service method is the
expense and time savings. However, large case volumes, expense savings, and time efficiencies
do not displace the need for a summons to be properly served in a judicial proceeding.
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available remedy for setting aside the judgment of default entered
against him."
The court went on to apply this standard to the facts of the case and
held that Bankruptcy Rule 704(c)(1) satisfied due process requirements
when interpreted in light of the available remedy of setting aside the default
upon the showing of a meritorious defense, which the defendant failed to
offer."' The entire reasoning and justification underlying the Park Nursing
Center, Inc. decision is based upon a foundation that the Supreme Court
later held to be constitutionally infirm in Peralta v. Heights Medical
Center, Inc."7 In that case, a party had obtained a default judgment in a
judicial proceeding despite defective service of process."' When the party
against whom the default judgment had been entered sought to have the
default judgment vacated, the lower state courts held that in order to vacate
the judgment, a meritorious defense must be shown regardless of whether
service or notice had been proper.119 The Supreme Court reversed holding
that "[w]here a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary
to the most basic tenets of due process, 'it is no answer to say that in his
particular case due process of law would have led to the same result
because he had no adequate defense upon the merits.' "20
The Supreme Court's decision in Peralta fully undermines the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Park Nursing Center, Inc. that
former Bankruptcy Rule 704(c)(1) satisfied due process requirements.
Consequently, the Park Nursing Center, Inc. decision provides little
support in favor of the constitutionality of Rule 7004(b)(1). Therefore,
reliance upon the Martin-Trigona and Park Nursing Center, Inc. decisions
to sustain the constitutional validity of Rule 7004(b)(1) is mistaken.
C. The Supreme Court's "Mailings" Jurisprudence Does Not Support
Serving a Summons by First Class Mail
Although personal service of written notice upon a defendant would
certainly constitute a constitutional safe harbor 2' for purposes of notice and
115. Id
116. Id. at 263-64.
117. 485 U.S. 80, 84-86 (1988).
118. Id. at 82.
119. Id at 83-84.
120. Id at 86-87 (quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915)).
121. For an example of constitutional safe harbors in a criminal procedure context, see Susan
R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental
Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1044-47 (2001); see also
James J. Kelly, Jr., Bringing Clarity to Title Clearing: Tax Foreclosure and Due Process in the
Internet Age, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 63, 95 (2008) ("Rules that protect constitutional rights can
provide enough efficiency through their clarity to justify any overinclusion that might result. But,
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is "always adequate in any type of proceeding,"' 22 the constitutional
mandate that a person not be deprived of property without due process of
law has not been interpreted to require actual notice.'23 Rather, there are
less rigorous notice procedures that have been determined to satisfy the
Due Process Clause's "constitutional minimum."'24 The Court's seminal
decision in Mullane, along with its progeny, require notice to be
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections."' 25
The Court has indicated its approval of the use of mail to provide
notice, but it has never approved the use of mail in a case involving both
service of a summons in a judicial proceeding and the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a court over the person of the defendant.
For example, Schroeder v. City of New York" 6 involved notice of an
administrative condemnation proceeding relating to a decrease in the flow
velocity of a river that ran along a landowner's property.'2 7 The Court held
that a plaintiff is "constitutionally obliged to make at least a good faith
effort to give [notice] personally to the [landowner]-an obligation which
the mailing of a single letter would have discharged."' 28
Another case involved a judicial forfeiture proceeding against an
automobile, where the defendant-owner was confined in jail at the time the
State of Illinois mailed notice of the proceeding to the defendant's home
the risk of underinclusion raises the need for greater caution. A constitutional safe harbor rule
should not trump a less determinate, but more accurate, standard unless the application of that
standard is intolerably indeterminate. Even when the true need for the creation of a constitutional
safe harbor has been demonstrated, the risk of underinclusion must be strictly limited.").
122. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
123. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) ("Due process does not require that a
property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his property."); Dusenbery
v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002) ("[Mennonite] does not say that the state must provide
actual notice, but that it must attempt to provide actual notice . . .. Mennonite concluded that
mailed notice of a pending tax sale to a mortgagee of record was constitutionally sufficient . . .
(emphasis in original)).
124. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1982) (explaining that the secure
posting of notice on property is in some circumstances an adequate method of providing notice to
the property owner that proceedings affecting his interests may be pending).
125. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167-68 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314) (explaining that
Mullane and its progeny supply "the appropriate analytical framework" for due process claims
under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments regarding the adequacy of notice).
126. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
127. Id. at 209 (quoting the Administrative Code of the City of New York which contained
the procedure to be followed by the New York Board of Water Supply in condemning land,
easements, and rights affecting real property required for the New York City water system).
128. Id. at 214. The interest being deprived was the impairment of the river's value to the
landowner arising from a decrease in the velocity of the river flow. Id. at 214 n.6.
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address.12 9 The Court held that notice by mail was not reasonably
calculated to apprise the defendant when the State knew that the defendant
was not at the address where the notice was mailed."' The interest being
deprived in that case was the potential forfeiture and sale of the defendant's
vehicle.i''
In a different case involving an eviction proceeding seeking
repossession of an apartment, a writ of forcible entry, and detainer was
served by posting a notice on the tenant's apartment door.'32 The notice was
likely removed by children or other tenants, prompting the Court to hold
"where the subject matter of the action also happens to be the mailing
address of the defendant, and where personal service is ineffectual, notice
by mail may reasonably be relied upon to provide interested persons with
actual notice of judicial proceedings.""' The interest being deprived was
possession of the apartment for the tenant's use and occupancy.134
On another occasion, the Court addressed the sufficiency of notice for
a tax sale of real property in order to pay delinquent taxes."' Notice of the
sale was given by publication, posting and mailed notice to the property
owner but not to the mortgagee holding a lien on the sold property."' The
Court held that "[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual
notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . . if its name
and address are reasonably ascertainable." 37
A few years later, the Court commented that "[w]e have repeatedly
recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that
is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice.""' This case involved the
deprivation of a creditor's cause of action against an estate for an unpaid
129. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 38 (1972) (per curiam). The State of Illinois
instituted forfeiture proceedings against appellant's automobile pursuant to the Illinois vehicle
forfeiture statute, which authorized service of notice by certified mail to the address listed in the
records of the Secretary of State. Id. at 38 n.1.
130. Id. at 39-40.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (relating to the sufficiency of a Kentucky statute
allowing service of process of a forcible entry or detainer action by posting a copy of a writ on
the door of the tenant's apartment).
133. Id. at 446. The Court explained that "posting" refers to the practice of placing the writ on
the property by use of a thumbtack, adhesive tape, or other means. Id. at 446 n.1.
134. Id. at 453.
135. Id. at 452.
136. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983). The interest being
deprived was a decrease in value of the mortgagee's lien arising from the tax-sale purchaser's lien
that was given priority over the lien of the mortgagee. Id. at 798.
137. Id. at 792-95 (concluding due process required notice of the tax sale to the mortgagee).
138. Tulsa Profl Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988).
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bill where a publication notice to creditors of an estate in a judicial probate
proceeding was found to be inadequate.139
In a case involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") non-
judicial process of administratively forfeiting cash and an automobile
seized pursuant to a search warrant,'40 the Court held that delivery of notice
using a certified letter was "a method our cases have recognized as
adequate for known addressees when we have found notice by publication
insufficient."l 4' The party appearing to have an interest in the cash and
automobile was incarcerated in a Federal Correctional Institution at the
time notice was sent.14 2
Finally, in a case involving an administrative tax sale of real
property,143 the Court noted that when a notice sent by certified mail was
returned to the sender as unclaimed "[o]ne reasonable step . . . would be for
the State to resend the notice by regular mail, so that a signature was not
required." 4 4 The interest being deprived was extinguishment of a property
owner's interest in a home.145
Although each of the above-described cases involved a risk of losing
significant property interests, none of the Court's decisions that approved
mailings involved (i) service of a summons in a judicial proceeding, (ii)
exercise of personal jurisdiction by a Court over the person of the
defendant, or (iii) a personal money judgment against the defendant.
There is a fundamental distinction between service of a judicial
summons as opposed to service of a notice that the government may take
someone's property. A summons carries out the dual purpose of providing
both personal jurisdiction to the court and notice to the defendant.
Although the Court has signified that the distinction between in rem and in
139. Id at 483-84 The Court confirmed that an intangible interest such as a cause of action is
a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 485.
140. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 163-64 (2002) (explaining designated agents
of the FBI were allowed to dispose of property seized pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act
without initiating judicial proceedings if the property's value did not exceed $100,000 and if no
person claimed an interest in the property within twenty days after the Government published
notice of its intention to forfeit and sell or otherwise dispose of it).
141. Id at 169.
142. Id at 164 (stating the forfeiture statute required written notice of the seizure to each
party who appeared to have an interest in the property and publication for at least three successive
weeks).
143. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223-24 (2006) (involving notice by publication and
certified mail where the certified mail was returned to the sender as "unclaimed").
144. Id. at 234. Interestingly, the Court noted that requiring further effort when the
govemment learns that notice was not delivered may cause "the government to favor modes of
providing notice that do not generate additional information-for example, starting (and
stopping) with regular mail instead of certified mail." Id. at 237.
145. Id at 230 (stating the subject matter of the letter concerned the important and irreversible
prospect of the loss of a house).
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personam jurisdiction is not determinative of the constitutional question,14
that distinction is one of the main differences between the Court's above-
mentioned "mailings" jurisprudence and adversary proceedings under Rule
7004(b)(1). Each of the Court's "mailings" cases was limited to an in rem
jurisdiction scenario.14 7 The Court has not indicated its approval of using
first class mail in an action or proceeding against a person.
The Court has emphasized that the nature of the action has a bearing
on the constitutional assessment of the reasonableness of the procedure
used.'48 Because of the nature of an adversary proceeding, a delivery
method that is more certain and fail-safe than first class mail should be
required.
Despite the Court's catch-all observation that "[a]ll proceedings, like
all rights, are really against persons," 4 9 a judicial summons is different
from a bill, tax assessment, or potential taking of real or personal property
because it is the method by which a court exercises power and authority
over the person of the defendant. Unlike a notice, which serves the purpose
of informing the recipient that a deprivation of property may occur, a
summons in an adversary proceeding is the assertion of judicial power over
the person of the defendant and is a condition precedent that must be
satisfied before a bankruptcy court can proceed to adjudicate the action.i"o
The timing of the corresponding result shows the difference. A notice is a
warning of future deprivation. A summons is the mechanism through which
jurisdiction and power over the person of the defendant is obtained. Service
of a summons yields the result, or at least part of it.' This is not to say that
a court's assertion of power and jurisdiction over a defendant through a
summons constitutes a deprivation. Otherwise defendants would be entitled
to a pre-summons notice that they may be served a summons.
146. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450 (1982) ("[W]e decline to resolve the constitutional
question based upon the determination whether the particular action is more properly
characterized as one in rem or in personam.").
147. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 214 n.6 (1962) (involving a river's
value); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39 (1972) (involving a vehicle); Greene, 456 U.S. at
452 (involving the possession of an apartment); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.
791, 798 (1983) (involving the value of a lien); Tulsa Profl Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (involving a cause of action to collect a bill); Jones, 547 U.S. at 230
(involving a home).
148. Greene, 456 U.S. at 450 ("The character of the action reflects the extent to which the
court purports to extend its power, and thus may roughly describe the scope of potential adverse
consequences to the person claiming a right to more effective notice.").
149. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 n.22 (1977) (quoting Tyler v. Court of
Registration, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (1900) (Holmes, C.J.)).
150. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f) (stating that serving a summons is "effective to establish
personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant").
151. Since a summons serves the dual role of providing both notice and assertion of power
over the defendant by the court, the result I am referring to is the assertion of power.
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"The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity"'52 of the
delivery method should be both different and heightened for a judicial
summons as opposed to a notice of a potential deprivation of property. This
distinction between giving notice and serving a summons was a cautionary
highlight of Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Dusenbery:
In these cases [referring to Mullane and its offspring], the Court
identified mail service as a satisfactory supplement to statutory
provisions for publication or posting. But the decisions, it bears note,
do not bless mail notice as an adequate-in-all-circumstances
substitute for personal service. They home in on the particular
proceedings at issue and do not imply that in the mine-run civil
action, a plaintiff may dispense with the straightforward, effective
steps required to secure proof of service or waiver of formal
service.i'
Justice Ginsburg's dissent recognizes the distinction between a notice
and a summons. Because of this difference, the Court's jurisprudence
approving various notices by mail neither supports nor provides a solid
basis for upholding the constitutional validity of serving a judicial
summons by first class mail under Rule 7004(b)(1).
D. Serving a Judicial Summons by First Class Mail Does Not Satisfy
Mullane's "Reasonably Calculated Under All Circumstances"
Standard
Rule 7004(b)(1) does not satisfy the "constitutional minimum"'54
prescribed by the Due Process Clause. The Court has indicated that
Mullane supplies the appropriate analytical framework for determining the
constitutional adequacy of a method used to give notice.i'5 Under Mullane,
notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.... The means employed must be
152. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
153. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
154. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982).
155. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168 ("Since Mullane was decided, we have regularly turned
to it when confronted with questions regarding the adequacy of the method used to give notice.").
Even though the Dusenbery Court rejected the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v.
Eldridge in favor of Mullane's test of reasonableness under all circumstances, the breadth of the
Mullane test encompasses the Mathews test. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
(identifying the following three factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action: second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards:
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail").
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such as one desirous of actually informing the [defendant] might
reasonably adopt to accomplish it."5 6 This Part looks at different aspects of
Rule 7004(b)(1) to determine if first class mail is reasonably calculated to
apprise under all the circumstances.
1. The Delivery Method of First Class Mail Goes Against the Reasonable
Expectations of Defendants
Defendants do not expect to be served a judicial summons through a
delivery method that is as informal as first class mail. Assessing the
expectations of defendants is appropriate because the intended beneficiary
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the recipient of the process, not
the sender.17 From the defendant's perspective, the delivery method
employed often corresponds to and reflects the significance of the contents
of the item delivered. A judicial summons and complaint are far more
significant than matters that are routinely delivered by regular first class
mail."'
Admittedly, important things are commonly sent by first class mail
such as bills, paychecks, vehicle registrations, retirement fund performance
reports, real property tax assessment notices, and a host of other matters.
But it is instructive to consider the delivery methods that are used to serve
notice in matters that are similar to or less significant than adversary
proceedings.
For example, in state court small-claims actions, where the interests at
stake are often capped by a set dollar amount such as $5,000, service by
first class mail alone is not allowed. 5 9 Internal revenue service agents
personally serve an individual notice if a person's property is at risk of
seizure for failure to pay federal taxes (and the amount of past due taxes
can be significantly less than the amount at issue in an adversary
proceeding). 6 1 In South Carolina, a summons may be served by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the
156. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
157. Tulsa Prof I Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 492 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
158. Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that a
request for a signature on a certified mail return receipt alerts the property owner that the letter
contained "something more than a routine interest").
159. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y. Civ. ACT § 1803(a) (McKinney 2011) (stating that in the
New York City Civil Court Small Claims Part, claims that are less than $5,000 are served on the
defendant by both first class mail and certified mail with return receipt); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ I 16.340(a)(1), (d) (providing that in Small Claims Court in California, claims that are less than
$7,500 may be served on the defendant by any form of mail providing for a return receipt and that
service is deemed complete on the date the defendant signs the mail return receipt).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (2006).
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addressee.' Routine debt collection actions often involve matters much
less significant in terms of dollar amounts than matters involved in
adversary proceedings, but these proceedings do not allow service by
regular first class mail.' 62
The unreasonableness of relying solely on first class mail for delivery
becomes clear after examining other methods of mail delivery. Certified
mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail, except it
"provides the sender with a mailing receipt and, upon request, electronic
verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was
made."i'6 Registered mail is the most secure service that the United States
Postal Service offers.' 64 It incorporates a system of receipts to monitor the
movement of the mail from the point of acceptance to delivery and
"provides the sender with a mailing receipt and, upon request, electronic
verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was
made."i'6 Senders may obtain a delivery record by purchasing return
receipt service.i'6
Requiring a signed receipt certainly alerts a recipient that the contents
of the envelope are more significant than an ordinary letter or junk mail. A
return receipt also provides the sender objective proof of service to the
address. If the postal service is unable to obtain a signed receipt, the return
of the unsigned receipt will give the sender notice that service has been
defective and further efforts are required. First class mail provides none of
these safeguards or advantages.
In the context of notice delivery methods, the Court has established a
positive relationship between the required level of notice, the extent of
governmental power that is exercised, and the type of right that is at risk:
[T]he nature of the action has [a] bearing on a constitutional
assessment of the reasonableness of the procedures employed. The
character of the action reflects the extent to which the court purports
to extend its power, and thus may roughly describe the scope of
161. S.C. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(8). This rule also states that if delivery of the process is refused or is
returned undelivered, service must be made as otherwise provided by the rules. Id.
162. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 415.20, 415.30; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 312-a (McKinney
2010).
163. See DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 77, at 503.3.2.1. In the context of an earlier
version of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one author has argued certified mail
represents the best tradeoff between the dual goals of actual notice and a simple, easy, low-cost
method of service. Ann Varnon Crowley, Note, Rule 4: Service by Mail May Cost You More
Than a Stamp, 61 IND. L.J. 217, 243 (1986).
164. See DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 77, at 503.2.2.1.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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potential adverse consequences to the person claiming a right to
more effective notice.167
A court's extension of power in an adversary proceeding is significant
because of the broad scope of matters involved in an adversary proceeding.
A default judgment in an adversary proceeding could contain an
injunctioni6 s or an order directing the defendant to pay a specified dollar
amount, turnover possession and title to a vehicle, or convey real estate to a
Bankruptcy Trustee. If the defendant does not comply, contempt
proceedings could follow.1 69 In addition, a plaintiff has a host of rights and
methods to enforce a default judgment against a defendanto70 that are not
merely limited to a specific item such as a vehicle or real estate. 171
There should be a positive relationship between the degree of power
asserted by a court and the method used to inform the defendant of that
power. As a practical matter, most individual defendants are not familiar
with Rule 7004(b)(1) and do not expect a mailed envelope that is received
in the same manner as junk mail to be a federal bankruptcy court exercising
power over the person of the addressee and summoning such person to
immediately respond or face having a judgment entered against them.
Rule 7004(b)(1) employs a service method that is not commensurate
with the legal ramifications of a judicial summons. Based on ordinary,
everyday experience, one would expect the commencement of a lawsuit to
involve more than just a single, regularly-stamped envelope casually
dropped off in a mail box. Rule 7004(b)(1) does not require the outside of
the envelope to indicate the contents are important, from a court, or that a
timely response is required.172 Nothing sets apart the delivery of mail
containing the summons and complaint from any other first class mail a
defendant might receive.
167. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450 (1982).
168. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7065 (incorporating significant portions of Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
169. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020.
170. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7069 (incorporating Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
A plaintiff can, for example, obtain a writ of execution and garnish the defendant's wages or have
a law enforcement officer seize and sell a defendant's non-exempt property. 30 AM. .JUR. 2d §§
67, 177, 552, 383. A judgment can be recorded in real property records and the defendant's real
property can be sold at a sheriffs sale. 30 AM. JUR. 2d §§ 48, 195. A judgment certainly
adversely effects a defendant's credit score, which in turn can effect significant aspects of a
defendant's life and standard of living.
171. Significantly, the losses at stake in the Court's "mailings" cases discussed in this Article
were limited to specific pieces of real or personal property. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States,
534 U.S. 161, 163 (2002) (seizure of knife, firearms, and automobile); Greene, 456 U.S. at 446
(repossession of apartment); Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1988) (tax
sale of real property).
172. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b)(1).
28 [Vol. 90
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 28 2012
SERVING A SUMMONS BY FIRST CLASS MAIL
Consideration of a bankruptcy court's assertion of power over a
defendant in other contexts is telling. For example, if a defendant attends a
hearing in connection with an adversary proceeding, the experience would
include the profound sense of respect that is often felt by individuals
standing in a courtroom. The defendant, along with all other individuals in
the room, would be commanded by the clerk to "rise!" when the
bankruptcy judge walks into the courtroom. A bailiff or marshal is often
visibly present. This type of experience with judicial power is a
considerable contrast to a defendant's experience with a bankruptcy court's
initial assertion of power through a summons that is delivered by regular
first class mail and is placed in a mailbox next to a coupon for a couple of
cents off of dairy products at a local grocery store. First class mail does not
satisfy the reasonable expectations of defendants.
2. Situations Where Rule 7004(b)(1) is Satisfied But No Notice is Given
In assessing the constitutionality of a notice procedure, the actual
application and practical effect of the procedure must be considered:
In arriving at the constitutional assessment, we look to the realities
of the case before us: In determining the constitutionality of a
procedure established by the State to provide notice in a particular
class of cases, "its effect must be judged in the light of its practical
application to the affairs of men as they are ordinarily conducted." 7 ,
There are numerous situations where Rule 7004(b)(1), as applied in
practice, results in defective service of process. For example, even
assuming the requirements of Rule 7004(b)(1) are strictly followed, the
defendant is not reasonably likely to receive the summons and complaint if
he or she is on an extended vacation or is sick in the hospital. In today's
modern society, individuals commonly travel and have transient work-
lives. Additionally, a mailing pursuant to Rule 7004(b)(1) could be
inadvertently thrown away as junk mail by a recipient because the recipient
does not recognize the sender.
From a more deviant perspective, service by mail under Rule
7004(b)(1) creates loopholes for a defendant to avoid service. Under the
United States Postal Service's Domestic Mail Manual, addressees may
control delivery of their mail.174 The Manual also allows addressees to
refuse to accept a mailpiece when it is offered for delivery.' One author
has written a chapter in a hypothetical "Handbook for Avoiding Service"
173. Greene, 456 U.S. at 451 (quoting North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276,
283 (1925)).
174. See DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 77, at 508.1.1.1.
175. Id. at 508.1.1.2.
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specifically on service by mail that summarizes alternative courses of
action a defendant may take to avoid being served."' For example, a
defendant can open a post office box and discontinue home delivery or
move to a new residence without filing a change of address or forwarding
order with the post office."'
There is also the concern that the mail, even if postage is properly paid
and it is correctly addressed, will not be delivered because of some fault of
the United States Postal Service. A growing number of courts are
acknowledging that "[t]he risk that letters may be lost in the mail is
commonly known.""' Postal mishandling, unforwardability, and
misdelivery are known realities. Many, if not most individuals, have
inadvertently received a mail piece that was addressed to a neighbor or
prior resident. Mullane requires notice methods be "reasonably calculated"
to reach the intended recipient. 7 9 The shortcomings of first class mail make
it not reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient and therefore an
inappropriate method for serving a summons under Rule 7004(b)(1).
3. Vacating or Setting Aside a Default Judgment Does Not Remedy the
Problem
In analyzing the constitutionality of notice, one factor the Court looks
to is the nature of the property right that is at risk." Although some have
argued that the entry of ajudgment is not a deprivation of property until the
stage of execution on the judgment,' it is well established that part of the
constitutional violation is the entry of the judgment itself-even if the
judgment is eventually vacated or set aside.'82 The Court has recognized the
real and present harm arising solely from the entry of a judgment:
176. Note, Service of Process by Mail, 74 MICH. L. REV. 381, 393-96 (1975).
177. Id. at 393-94.
178. Lechoslawv. Bank of Am., N.A., 618 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Greene, 456
U.S. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the risk that regular mail "might fail due to loss,
misdelivery, lengthy delay, or theft" and observing that "[i]t is no secret, after all, that unattended
mailboxes are subject to plunder by thieves"); Jones v. Flowers 547 U.S. 220, 247 (2006)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing unreliability of service by regular mail); Miserandino v.
Resort Props., Inc., 691 A.2d 208, 215 (1997) (discussing unreliability of regular mail as an
exclusive method of notice).
179. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
180. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 230 (stating that the fact that "the subject matter of the letter
concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house" is a key consideration
in determining the adequacy of service).
181. Windsor Commc'ns Grp. Inc. v. Grant (In re Grant), 75 B.R. 713, 737-38 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1985) (holding that Rule 7004(b) withstands a constitutional due process challenge because
upon the threat of execution, a defendant can assert the defense of no jurisdiction based on lack of
proper service of a complaint).
182. Peraltav. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85 (1988).
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Nor is there any doubt that the entry of the judgment itself had
serious consequences. It is not denied that the judgment was entered
on the county records, became a lien on appellant's property, and
was the basis for issuance of a writ of execution under which
appellant's property was promptly sold without notice. Even if no
execution sale had yet occurred, the lien encumbered the property
and impaired appellant's ability to mortgage or alienate it; and state
procedures for creating and enforcing such liens are subject to the
strictures of due process."'
At its core, an individual has a right to not have a judgment entered
against him or her where notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to
participate were "mere gestures"-that is the message of Mullane.'84 It is
flawed logic to argue Rule 7004(b)(1) is constitutional because in the event
a defendant does not receive the summons, the defendant has the ability
later on to vacate or set aside the default judgment. At that point, the
constitutional violation has already occurred. In addition, the bankruptcy
court would be entering a judgment without having jurisdiction over the
defendant. The entry of the judgment itself, independent of whether it is
recorded in the real property records or collection attempts are made, is a
deprivation of rights under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the burden
would be on the defendant to hire an attorney and expend money to get the
default judgment set aside.
Presumably, the primary rationale behind Rule 7004(b)(1) is to reduce
the cost and delay of serving the summons and complaint while still
maintaining efficient administration of bankruptcy proceedings. When
default judgments are later required to be set aside or vacated because of
deficient service of process, it defeats the entire goal behind Rule
7004(b)(1) allowing service by mail. The argument that a wrongfully
entered default judgment can be vacated or set aside provides little support
for upholding the constitutionality of Rule 7004(b)(1).
4. First Class Mail Creates Proof of Service Problems and a Plaintiffs
Ignorance Should Not Be Bliss
One major problem of Rule 7004(b)(1) is that it provides no
confirmation to the server that the summons has been received by the
defendant. Bankruptcy Rule 1001 states "[t]hese rules shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and
proceeding.""' Rule 7004(b)(1) seems to focus solely on the "speedy" and
183. Id. at 85 (internal citation omitted).
184. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 ("[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process.").
185. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
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"inexpensive" parameters while forgetting the "just" requirement."' By not
requiring a return or acknowledgement of receipt and relying solely upon
first class mail, Rule 7004(b)(1) does not provide a high level of confidence
that the summons was delivered.1 7
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a) incorporates Rule 4(l)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that unless service is waived, proof
of service must be made to the court by the server's affidavit.' The
problem is that a server using first class mail has no idea of whether the
defendant received the summons and complaint. Rule 7004(b)(1) has no
procedure or method for the server to confirm or know if the envelope was
delivered or received. The server can only confirm the envelope was
deposited with the United States Postal Service. There is a gap in the chain
of custody between depositing the envelope and its presumed delivery.
In the context of evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of a notice
method, the Court has held that information demonstrating that a notice
was not received by the intended recipient was a pivotal factor.' 89 In Jones
v. Flowers, the Court held that "when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned
unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to
provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is
practicable to do so."l90 Under Rule 7004(b)(1), the server does not know if
the summons and complaint were received or not.
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(e) exacerbates the problem by stating that
service of process by mail is complete on mailing.' 9' This means the time in
which a defendant must respond starts running before the defendant has
received the summons or complaint. Presumably, this is why a defendant
has thirty days to respond instead of the shorter twenty days that is
generally allowed in federal and state courts.' 92 The obvious problem with
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(e) is that in those situations where the first class
mailing is not delivered, the time period in which a defendant must respond
186. Flores v. Sadafi (In re Safadi), 431 B.R. 478, 482 (Bankr. D. Az. 2010) (finding service
was proper despite the defendant's forty day absence from the address to which the summons was
mailed).
187. Miserandino v. Resort Props., Inc., 691 A.2d 208, 215 (Md. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
953 (1997); W.S. Frey Co., Inc. v. Heath, 729 A.2d 1037, 1039 (N.J. 1999); Shah v. HealthPlus,
Inc., 696 A.2d 473, 481 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1997) ("[1]t is ordinarily customary and reasonable
for a correspondence of significance, in particular documentation regarding financial or legal
matters ... to be sent by a form of delivery that can insure and provide acknowledgement of
receipt.").
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(1)(1).
189. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225 (2006).
190. Id.
191. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(e) ("Service of process and service of any paper other than
process or of notice by mail is complete on mailing.").
192. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a).
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has started and continued to run despite the non-occurrence of the event
(i.e. service) that is presumed to occur a day or two after the mailing.'93
One problem arising from the effect of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(e) is
that even if the summons and complaint are returned to the sender by the
United States Postal Service marked "unclaimed," "undeliverable," or
"wrong address," the effect of the plain language of Bankruptcy Rule
9006(e) would be that service has been complete and jurisdiction has
attached. Although this potential problem has been softened by the Court's
holding in Jones v. Flowers, which allowed consideration of what a sender
does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed, 94 the question of whether
it is constitutional to serve a summons by first class mail remains
unanswered.
A person electing to serve process by first class mail is not on the
same constitutionally-required level as "one desirous of actually informing
the [intended recipient]."' 95 First class mail allows the server to avoid
learning whether process was received. Ignorance should not be bliss when
it comes to the obligation to serve a judicial summons and provide proof of
service.
5. Service by Mail Under Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is Appropriate Because it is Based on the Consent of the
Defendant
Rule 4(d)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a plaintiff may notify a defendant by "first-class mail or other reliable
means" that an action has been commenced and request that the defendant
waive service of a summons.196 Rule 4(d)(1)(C) requires a waiver form and
a prepaid means for returning the form to be included in the mailing of the
complaint. In contrast, Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(1) only requires a
summons and complaint be mailed.19 7
Another difference between Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 7004(b)(1) is that service is not complete under Rule
4(d) upon the mailing. Rule 4(d)(2) provides that if a defendant fails to sign
193. Conceptually, there is also a slice of time (from the time the plaintiff deposits the
envelope in the mail to the time when the mail is delivered to the defendant) in which a
bankruptcy court would be deemed to have jurisdiction over a defendant even though the
defendant has not received the summons or complaint.
194. 547 U.S. at 231 ("[1]f a feature of the State's chosen procedure is that it promptly
provides additional information to the government about the effectiveness of notice, it does not
contravene the ex ante principle to consider what the government does with that information in
assessing the adequacy of the chosen procedure.").
195. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(G).
197. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b)(1).
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and return the waiver without good cause, the court must impose on the
defendant the expenses "later incurred in making service."' 98 Thus, by the
language of Rule 4(d), service is deemed waived only when the defendant
signs and returns the waiver, not when the papers are mailed, and
significantly, not when the defendant receives the mail.' 99 Although others
have written in opposition to an earlier version of Rule 4(d),200 the
acknowledgement requirement in Rule 4(d) provides assurance of receipt
as well as the defendant's acceptance of, and consent to, service. There is
an objective verification (the returned acknowledgment) that the plaintiff
can use to provide proof that service was waived and due process was
satisfied. Rule 7004(b)(1), on the other hand, requires no acknowledgement
and has no correlating safeguards.
It is significant that a summons is not included in the items that are
mailed to a defendant under the waiver of service procedure in Rule 4(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.20 ' Rule 4(d)(4) states that when a
waiver is filed, the rules "apply as if a summons and complaint had been
served at the time of filing the waiver."202 There is no justifiable distinction
as to why a less stringent method of service is allowed in an adversary
proceeding, which is a civil lawsuit in federal court with a nexus or
connection to a bankruptcy case, when an identical civil lawsuit without the
nexus to a bankruptcy case would require the waiver acknowledgement or
some other more stringent method of service. Comparing Rule 7004(b)(1)
to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shows how the
efficiency of first class mail delivery can be utilized without violating the
due process rights of a defendant.
6. Proper Service of a Summons in Judicial Proceedings is Necessary
Proper service is essential to judicial proceedings because service of
process upon a defendant is necessary for a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant and is fundamental to any procedural
imposition on a defendant.203 "In the absence of service of process (or
waiver of service by the defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2)(A).
199. KENT SINCLAIR, I SINCLAIR ON FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE § 2:7.2 (4th ed. 2010).
200. Crowley, supra note 163, at 217.
201. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d)(1)(c) (stating the notice and request for a waiver must "be
accompanied by a copy of the complaint, 2 copies of a waiver form, and a prepaid means for
returning the form").
202. Id. at 4(d)(4).
203. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). For an
engaging summary of the historical roots of service of process, see Sinclair, supra note 1, at 1183.
34 [Vol. 90
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 34 2012
SERVING A SUMMONS BY FIRST CLASS MAIL
power over a party the complaint names as defendant."204 This is because
"service of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the
person of the party served."205
Thus, "[b]efore a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be
satisfied."206 One becomes an official party to an action, and is required to
take action in that capacity only upon service of a summons or other
authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served
must appear and defend.207 One bankruptcy court has explained the
importance of a summons in this manner:
A summons serves a particularly important role in litigation,
establishing as it does that legal action has actually been commenced
in a court to which a defendant is called to respond. While in part
serving the perhaps antiquated function and concept of formally
"bringing" a defendant before a court, the detailed contents of the
summons provided for by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(a)(1)/Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(a)(1) serve the necessary function of establishing the official
formality of the initiation of litigation, and provide notice of the
initiation of litigation. It is for this reason that Rule 4(c)(1)
absolutely requires that a copy of a summons be served upon a
putative defendant.208
Courts have a compelling interest in making sure defendants receive
summonses. Admittedly, there may be some additional delay (and judicial
economy implications) arising from the elimination of first class mail alone
as a service method, but such additional delay is already being acceptably
borne by federal courts in the context of civil proceedings governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
E. Other Considerations
There are other items that should be considered when making an
analysis of the constitutional sufficiency of Rule 7004(b)(1). One item is
the plaintiffs self-interest and the risk of perjury when it comes to making
proper service. The Bankruptcy Rules are not clear on whether service by
first class mail may be made by the plaintiff or if it must be made by a
204. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350 (holding service of a summons must occur before one is
subject to any court's authority).
205. Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946).
206. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
207. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350: see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a),
(b), (c)(1).
208. Tully v. Haughee (In re Haughee), 428 B.R. 828, 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ind., 2010).
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person who is not a party. Under Rule 4(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, any person who is not a party may serve a summons and
complaint.20 9 Rule 4(c)(2) is not incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule
7004(a)(1). Although Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a)(1) does state "personal
service" may be made by any person who is not a party, the authorization is
limited to personal service and does not include service by first class
mail.210
Rule 4(c)(1) is incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a)(1) and states
that the plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint
served and "must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes
service."2 1' The requirement that the plaintiff must furnish copies to the
person who makes service implies the plaintiff is not a person authorized to
serve the summons and complaint.2 12 This implication is certainly not clear.
Even if a party other than the plaintiff deposits the envelope into the mail
and physical delivery is made by a United States Postal Service worker, the
research and confirmation that a correct address is used should be the
responsibility of the plaintiff-who is the party standing to gain from the
summons and complaint.
A plaintiff does have an incentive to do its own due diligence and use
a correct mailing address. If it is later determined that the plaintiff sent the
summons and complaint to the wrong address or the mailing was otherwise
deficient, any subsequent default judgment may be voidable upon a motion
to dismiss or vacated for lack of jurisdiction.2 13
From the plaintiffs perspective, another concern arises from the effect
of Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is incorporated
by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a)(1). Rule 4(m) states that "[i]f a defendant is
not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court-on
motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the action
without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specified time."2 14 The concern is that a first class mailing may
have been sent and the plaintiff later discovers after the 120-day time
period has expired that for some reason, service was defective. The 120-
day time limit may be extended if the plaintiff shows good cause.215 At
least one court has held that the "good cause" must relate to the reasons
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2).
210. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(a)(1).
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).
212. Lehrer v. Flaherty (In re Flaherty), 432 B.R. 742, 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
213. Reaves v. Ams. Serv. Co. (In re Reaves), 396 B.R. 708, 716 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn 2008)
(holding that because service of process was improper, the court had no personal jurisdiction over
the defendant at the time the judgment was rendered and, therefore, the judgment was void).
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
215. Id.
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why service of process was not made in a timely manner, not to other
reasons of why an adversary proceeding should not be dismissed.2 16
Depending on how much time has expired under the applicable statute of
limitations at the time of the dismissal, a plaintiffs election to attempt to
serve process by first class mail may be fatal to its claim.
111. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The concerns raised in this Article should be resolved by deleting Rule
7004(b)(1)'s alternate method allowing individuals to be served by first
class mail. 2 17 Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a)(1) already incorporates significant
portions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.218 The service
waiver and acknowledgement procedure contained in Rule 4(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be adopted and incorporated into
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b). 2 9 The signed acknowledgment of a consenting
defendant eliminates due process concerns that arise from service by first
class mail alone. In the event an acknowledgment is not timely returned,
Rule 4(d) still requires service to be made.
Admittedly, deleting the first class mail alternative may220 increase the
cost of service22'-but an identical cost burden is borne by plaintiffs in
federal lawsuits governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without
momentous effects. In addition, the increased cost of service arising from
eliminating the first class mail alternative is immaterial. Even though there
is a dramatic difference between the cost of a stamp and the cost of paying
a private process server or utilizing other service methods allowed under
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the increased cost is still no
more than a few hundred dollars. The filing fee to start adversary
216. S. Indus. Banking Corp. v. DuVoisin (In re S. Indus. Banking Corp.), 205 B.R. 525, 534
(E.D. Tenn. 1996) (noting that good cause relates to the diligence and reasonable efforts to serve
process).
217. An amendment to Rule 7004 may also necessitate a change to Bankruptcy Rule 9014(b),
which provides that motions in contested matters must be served in the manner provided for
service of a summons and complaint by Rule 7004. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(b). However,
because the nature of the interest at stake for contested matters resolved by motions is not as
significant as initial service of a summons in a judicial proceeding, service of motions in
contested matters by first class mail may be appropriate.
218. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(a)(1).
219. From a drafting perspective, this could easily be accomplished by deleting the carve-out
of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) that is currently referenced in FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(a)(1).
220. If Rule 7004(b)(1) is amended to incorporate FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), and a defendant
returns the acknowledgment form, there would be no increase in the cost of service.
221. Suggesting the perfect solution is difficult, if not impossible. See Crowley, supra note
163, at 239 ("For any one service procedure to be simple and economical, and at the same time
failsafe for achieving actual notice, is ultimately impossible.").
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proceedings is $250.222 If the cost of personal service as opposed to the cost
of a stamp has a chilling effect upon a plaintiffs claim, then that simply
shows that the claim does not have enough merit to be brought. It is a
materiality analysis. Three hundred dollars to properly serve a defendant
will be immaterial to a plaintiff in most adversary proceedings. In fact,
deleting first class mail under Rule 7004(b)(1) may actually further judicial
economy because it would screen out claims involving trivial amounts.
Deleting service by first class mail eliminates the uncertainty of
whether the summons was properly served and helps avoid proof of service
problems.223 It also avoids the risk of recipients not realizing the contents of
the envelope are more significant than an ordinary letter or junk mail. Not
allowing first class mail service also gets around the concern that a plaintiff
may not know that service has been defective and further efforts are
required.
CONCLUSION
Delivering a summons by first class mail is an example of how far
service methods have eroded. The creation of first class mail as a service
method occurred before the vast expansion of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, both as to subject matter and nationwide personal jurisdiction.
Reliance upon the Martin-Trigona and Park Nursing Center, Inc. decisions
to sustain the constitutional validity of Rule 7004(b)(1) is mistaken. The
Supreme Court's decisions approving various notices by mail do not
support or provide a basis for serving a judicial summons by first class
mail. Defendants do not expect to be served a judicial summons through a
delivery method as informal as first class mail. Under Mullane's analytical
framework, this delivery method is not reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise and therefore violates due process. Rule
7004(b)(1)'s allowance of service by first class mail should be deleted and
replaced with the acknowledgment procedure contained in Rule 4(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
222. See US COURTS, FORMS AND FEES, Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule
issuedpursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1930(b), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
FormsAndFees/Fees/BankruptcyCourtMiscellaneousFeeSchedule.aspx (last visited Aug. 19,
2011).
223. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(a) (incorporating FED. R. Civ. P. 4(1)(1), which states "proof of
service must be made to the court").
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